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REFORMASI AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION:
WHY INDONESIA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY
STRATEGY SHOULD BE REFORMED TO EFFECTIVELY
COMBAT PUBLIC CORRUPTION
INTRODUCTION: INDONESIA’S SOLUTION TO PUBLIC CORRUPTION BY THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRALIZED ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY
Indonesia was once at the “forefront of Asia’s economic miracle.”1 Under
President Suharto, Indonesia experienced “impressive gains in overall
economic growth.”2 However, poverty remained pervasive, and corruption had
“grown along with the economy.”3 In 1998, Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”)4 ranked Indonesia as number eighty out
of eighty-five countries,5 placing the nation as one of the most corrupt
countries in the world.6 Economic distortions caused by public corruption in
Indonesia were a major factor contributing to the Asian Financial Crisis of
1998, leading to massive riots7 and a “total meltdown of governance.”8

1 Asia’s Economic Flu, PBS (Jan. 9, 1998), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june98/
indonesia_1-9.html.
2 Donald K. Emmerson, No Miracle, No Mirage, WILSON Q., Spring 1981, at 125, 126.
3 Id.
4 The CPI “measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories
around the world. The CPI is a ‘survey of surveys,’ based on 13 different expert and business surveys.”
Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/cpi/2009 (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
5 The Corruption Perceptions Index (1998), TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/
policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/previous_cpi/1998 (last visited Jan. 29, 2011). The CPI rankings show
how one country compares to the others. See id. The lower the numerical rank, the less perceived corruption
takes place in that particular state. See id.
6 Fiona Robertson-Snape, Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism in Indonesia, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 589,
589 (1999).
7 Philip Shenon, THE SUHARTO BILLIONS: A Special Report; For Asian Nation’s First Family,
Financial Empire Is in Peril, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/16/business/
suharto-billions-special-report-for-asian-nation-s-first-family-financial-empire.html;
Richard
Robison,
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism After Suharto: Indonesia’s Past or Future?, IIAS NEWSL. (Int’l Inst. for
Asian Stud., Leiden, Neth.), Spring 2006, at 13, 13.
8 Indonesia’s Riots, PBS: PUB. BROADCASTING SERVICE (May 14, 1998), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/asia/jan-june98/indonesia_5-14.html.
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After 1998, Indonesia launched into a period of reform, commonly referred
to as Reformasi.9 Integral to the concept of Indonesia’s reform agenda is the
eradication of corruption. In hopes of duplicating Hong Kong’s successful
corruption-fighting
strategy,10
Indonesia
established
the
Komisi
Permberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission—“KPK”), a
centralized anti-corruption agency.11 Over a seven-year time span, this
centralized anti-corruption agency has investigated, prosecuted, and achieved a
100% conviction rate in eighty-six cases of bribery and graft related to
government procurements and budgets.12 The KPK has become internationally
acclaimed—high-ranking businessmen, bureaucrats, bankers, governors,
diplomats, lawmakers, prosecutors, police officials, and other previously
“untouchable” members of Indonesian society have “been made to discover a
phenomenon new to [Indonesia]: the perp walk.”13
As of 2011, Indonesia stands at a critical juncture. Although the KPK has
attained some high profile convictions,14 Indonesia’s problems with public
corruption are still pervasive. For instance, the CPI ranked Indonesia 111 out
of 180 countries, evidencing that Indonesia still has room for improvement.15
Curbing public corruption is imperative because it taxes the poor, increases
macroeconomic risks, jeopardizes financial stability, compromises law and
order,16 and deters foreign investment,17 which is critical for a poor developing
country such as Indonesia. Although anti-corruption agencies like the KPK are
9

Reformasi means “reform” in Indonesia. MARY P. CALLAHAN, CTR. FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCH., CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDONESIA: REFORMASI AND BEYOND 5 (1999).
The era of Reformasi refers to the time after Suharto’s reign, and it is still ongoing. See Stephen Coates, 12
Years On, How Sick Is Indonesia’s Reformasi?, JAKARTA GLOBE (May 22, 2010), http://www.thejakartaglobe.
com/home/12-years-on-how-sick-is-indonesias-Reformasi/376453. See generally WORLD BANK, COMBATING
CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA: ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR DEVELOPMENT (2003), available at http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/Publication/03-Publication/Combating+Corruption+
in+Indonesia-Oct15.pdf (discussing accountability as a means of challenging corruption in Indonesia).
10 See JOHN R. HEILBRUNN, ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS, PANACEA OR REAL MEDICINE TO FIGHT
CORRUPTION 3–5 (2004), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.
pdf.
11 See infra text accompanying note 123; KPK: The Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia,
HONG KONG ICAC, http://www.icac.org.hk/newsl/issue22eng/button3.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
12 Norimitsu Onishi, Corruption Fighters Rouse Resistance in Indonesia, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/world/asia/26indo.html.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, supra note 4.
16 WORLD BANK, supra note 9, at ii.
17 See Christopher J. Robertson & Andrew Watson, Corruption and Change: The Impact of Foreign
Direct Investment, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 385, 385 (2004) (analyzing the relationship between corruption and
foreign investment).
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theoretically an “efficient tool”18 for combating corruption, research has shown
that they fail to “reduce public sector venality in all but a few special
circumstances.”19 They are also expensive to implement.20 Because an anticorruption agency inherently carries a high probability of failure, financially
strained countries like Indonesia should proceed with much caution when
implementing this strategy.
Because of Indonesia’s ratification of the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (“UNCAC”), Indonesia is required to have some sort of
anti-corruption agency strategy.21 Although anti-corruption agencies carry a
high risk of failure, countries can increase the anti-corruption agency’s
possibility of success by solidifying corruption laws, strengthening its political
will, and improving cross-agency cooperation.22 Additionally, there are
different types of anti-corruption agency strategies, and these strategies are not
created equal.23 Some anti-corruption agencies focus solely on preventive
activities, whereas others encompass some combination of preventive,
prosecutorial, and investigative activities.24 This Comment evaluates the
KPK’s current strategy and determines that the agency’s framework needs to
be revised to improve Indonesia’s possibility of successful corruption reform.
Part I examines Indonesia’s historical problems with corruption and
establishes why eradicating corruption is imperative to Indonesia’s continued
economic growth and political stability. It also establishes that Indonesia’s
traditional framework failed to curb public corruption, evidencing a need for a
coordinating body entrusted with the sole function of curbing public
corruption. Part II discusses anti-corruption agencies, with particular focus on
two different anti-corruption agency strategies—the centralized and multiagency approach—in the context of two countries: the United States and Hong
Kong. Afterwards, the KPK’s approach is discussed in further detail. Part III
identifies areas Indonesia needs to improve upon, regardless of whether a
multi-agency or centralized strategy is adopted, to increase the probability of
its anti-corruption agency’s success. Part IV establishes that the KPK should
18 U.N. Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Global Programme Against Corruption: An
Outline for Action 9 (Feb. 1999), http://www.uncjin.org/CICP/Corrupti_e.pdf.
19 HEILBRUNN, supra note 10, at 2.
20 Id. at 10.
21 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003)
[hereinafter UNCAC].
22 HEILBRUNN, supra note 10, at 14–15.
23 Id.
24 Id.

MACMILLAN GALLEYSFINAL

590

6/28/2011 10:48 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

move away from its current centralized approach and adopt the multi-agency
approach with an emphasis on preventive activities to achieve meaningful,
long-term corruption reform.
I. A HISTORY OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA
Indonesia has a deep-rooted history with public corruption, and its
detrimental effects necessitate an effective solution to curb this endemic
problem. Public corruption is defined as the “abuse of public power for private
gain.”25 Indonesia’s problem with public corruption is significant because it is
“‘a tragic form of regressive taxation. The poor pay higher prices because of
all the monopolies, and they have to pay off government officials for
everything they need.’”26 Apart from the economic costs, public corruption has
a damaging social cost. As the United Nations (“UN”) states, public corruption
“undermin[es] the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and
justice, and jeopardize[s] sustainable development and the rule of law.”27
This Part examines the detrimental effects of public corruption in Indonesia
and establishes why Indonesia’s traditional institutional framework failed to
curb the endemic problem. First, this Part explores how an Indonesian leader’s
acts of public corruption caused Indonesia to experience severe political and
economic instability. Second, this Part considers that, although Indonesia is
now relatively stable, corruption reform is needed for continued economic and
political stability and increased foreign investment. Third, this Part covers
Indonesia’s traditional institutional framework for combating corruption,
obviating a need for a coordinating agency that is solely entrusted with curbing
public corruption.
A. Indonesia’s Meltdown in Governance Because of Public Corruption
Indonesia’s problem with public corruption is exemplified by Indonesia’s
“total meltdown in governance” caused by its kleptocratic leader, President
Suharto, in 1998.28 At the time, Indonesia had been governed by Suharto for
over three decades.29 Under Suharto, Indonesia experienced “impressive gains
25

Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 803, 807 (2006).
Adam Schwarz, Indonesia After Suharto, FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 1997, at 119, 127.
27 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC South Eastern Europe on Corruption, http://www.unodc.
org/southeasterneurope/en/Corruption.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
28 Indonesia’s Riots, supra note 8.
29 Suharto, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/572060/
Suharto (last visited Jan. 29, 2011) (noting that Suharto was president of Indonesia from 1967 to 1998).
26
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in overall economic growth.”30 However, poverty remained pervasive, and
corruption had “grown along with the economy.”31 Suharto and his family
were indelibly associated with korrupsi, kollusi, nepotisme—or corruption,
collusion, and nepotism32—an Indonesian “fact of life” during Suharto’s
reign.33
The Suharto family’s policy of corruption, collusion, and nepotism was
successful because of the amount of power they held in Indonesia.34 The
Suharto family owned hundreds of companies, including television and radio
networks, banks, hotels, railroads, and taxi companies.35 Just “‘[l]ike a mafia
boss,’” Suharto followed a policy of protecting himself by ensuring that his
political advisors and associates were corrupt as well.36 For instance, when
Indonesia’s privatization campaign began in the late 1980s, this “privatization”
was, in essence, the transfer of assets to Suharto’s inner circle—the “political
elite.”37 Because the bulk of Indonesian corporations were owned by the
political elite, any foreign investor who wanted to undertake any major
infrastructure or mining project in Indonesia was “forced to seek a partner
among” Suharto’s political leaders.38
The political elite’s unchecked corrupt practices neutralized competition,
drove out foreign investment, and kept the price of food and other basic
commodities artificially high.39 Because of Indonesia’s problems with public
corruption, Suharto was ranked as the most corrupt leader “‘of all time’” by
Transparency International.40 Suharto’s alleged misappropriation has been
estimated to be about $73 billion during his reign, although his annual salary
was approximately only $200,000 a year.41
30

Emmerson, supra note 2, at 126.
Id.
32 Robertson-Snape, supra note 6, at 589.
33 Benjamin B. Wagner & Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Retooling Law Enforcement to Investigate and
Prosecute Entrenched Corruption: Key Criminal Procedure Reforms for Indonesia and Other Nations, 30 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 183, 199 (2008).
34 John Colmey et al., Indonesia: It’s All in the Family, TIME, May 31, 1999, http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,991081-4,00.html.
35 Shenon, supra note 7.
36 Schwarz, supra note 26, at 126–27.
37 Id. at 127.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Haider Rizvi, Corruption Summit Opens as ‘World’s Most Corrupt Leader’ Dies, ONEWORLD.NET
(Jan. 30, 2008), http://us.oneworld.org/node/157321.
41 Id.; see also Andre Vitchek, Suharto: As He Lays Dying, WORLDPRESS.ORG (Jan. 25, 2008),
http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/3052.cfm.
31
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Suharto’s misappropriation of financial wealth was a major factor in
Indonesia’s “meltdown” in governance in 1998.42 Economic distortions created
by Suharto’s business empire have been named as the “integral” reason for the
Asian Financial Crisis of 1998,43 where Indonesia’s currency decreased to less
than 70% of its value in 1997.44 When the International Monetary Fund offered
Suharto a $43 billion bailout package, Indonesia’s leaders agreed to cut
budgets and subsidies.45 However, this caused food, fuel, and transportation
costs to soar.46 Food shortages and mass unemployment led to student-run
demonstrations against Suharto in May 2008.47 These demonstrations exposed
Suharto’s acts of malfeasance to the Indonesian public, sparking widespread
riots throughout Jakarta, Indonesia’s capital.48
The massive riots quickly evolved into pogroms targeting ChineseIndonesians, who were stereotypically known as an economically affluent
group of society.49 As a result, over 5000 people lost their lives, over 1000
women were raped, and numerous commercial centers were burned down.50
Due to the riots, Suharto was forced to resign from power on May 21, 1998,51
ending the era commonly referred to as the “New Order”52 and starting the
period known as Reformasi, which is still ongoing.53
When Suharto resigned, Indonesia was on the “brink of catastrophe.”54
Indonesia faced complete “economic collapse, political chaos, and fissile
separatist insurgencies” from other Indonesian islands such as Aceh and East

42

Robertson-Snape, supra note 6, at 600.
Shenon, supra note 7.
44 Id.
45 Bailout, PBS (May 4, 1998), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june98/indonesia_5-4.html.
46 Id.
47 J. Tim Thompson, Why Indonesia Matters, PHILA. TRUMPET, July 1998, http://www.thetrumpet.com/
?q=110.49.4.0.
48 Indonesia Hikes Fuel Prices—May 25, ENERGY BULL. (May 25, 2008), http://www.energybulletin.net/
node/44819.
49 Ethnic Chinese Hit by Fresh Indonesian Riots, BBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 1998, 9:15 AM), http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/events/indonesia/special_report/150264.stm.
50 Indonesia, COALITION AGAINST TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN, http://www.catwinternational.org/factbook/
Indonesia.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
51 See id.
52 See Franz Magnis-Suseno, Langsir Keprabon: New Order Leadership, Javanese Culture, and the
Prospects for Democracy in Indonesia, in POST-SOEHARTO INDONESIA: RENEWAL OR CHAOS? 214, 214–18
(Geoff Forrester ed., 1999).
53 See Coates, supra note 9.
54 A Special Report on Indonesia: A Golden Chance, ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.
economist.com/node/14391414?story_id=14391414.
43
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Timor.55 “Indonesia’s neighbours feared the worst: anarchy within Indonesia; a
surge in Islamic extremism; an exodus of desperate boat-people; [and] rampant
piracy in some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.”56
B. The Failed Anti-Corruption Framework in Indonesia During the New
Order
During the New Order, Indonesia had an institutional framework in place to
combat public corruption; however, it failed to work.57 This institutional
framework theoretically covered deterrence, detection, and punishment of
corrupt practices.58
For instance, both the Indonesian National Police and the Attorney
General’s Office had separate departments in place to detect and investigate
cases of corruption.59 There were financial agencies, whose duties were to
audit state-owned companies and oversee the implementation of the state
budget.60 These financial agencies were entrusted with detecting possible
instances of corruption occurring within the public sector concerning the
misappropriation of government money.61 Additionally, government complaint
agencies had been in place where the public could issue complaints involving
the conduct of government institutions and officials.62 Lastly, almost every
single Indonesian governmental agency had a branch the responsibility of
which was to monitor possible instances of corruption within the respective
agencies and to discipline any corrupt officials.63 However, these branches
were not able to issue criminal sanctions against these corrupt officials.64
Although Indonesia theoretically had an institutional framework to combat
corruption during the New Order, about every single agency within Indonesia

55 Indonesia’s Future: A Golden Opportunity, ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.economist.com/
node/14416780?story_id=14416780.
56 Id.
57 Ibrahim Assegaf, Legends of the Fall: An Institutional Analysis of Indonesian Law Enforcement
Agencies Combating Corruption, in CORRUPTION IN ASIA: RETHINKING THE GOVERNANCE PARADIGM 127,
128 (Tim Lindsey & Howard Dick eds., 2002).
58 Id. at 130.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 128–29.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 129–30.
63 Id. at 129.
64 Id.
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had become its own micro-center for corruption.65 Because the majority of the
judiciary, executive agencies, and legislative branches of government were
corrupt, “centres of corruption” developed, which had become almost
impossible to defeat.66 Ibrahim Assegaf describes this cycle as a “three-level
food chain.”67 As he notes:
At the first level, the alleged corruptors feed the police and the
prosecutor . . . in the investigation process during which the police or
the prosecutor are required to decide whether corruption has actually
occurred and commence further investigation . . . . If the case
advances to prosecution and trial in the court, the second stage,
prosecutor will play a significant role in deciding the
charge . . . which will be filed against the alleged corruptors.
Eventually, the process reaches the courts, at the top of the food
chain. The judges decide whether the alleged corruptors are guilty or
innocent and, if guilty, what the proper sentence should be. Lawyers
representing the alleged corruptor act as corruption brokers
68
throughout the process.

In addition to this three-level food chain, there was distrust amongst the
different agencies in combating corruption.69 Indonesia’s asset recovery for
corruption was dismal: less than 0.05% was recovered out of an estimated
three trillion rupiah lost by corrupt practices between 1999 and 2000.70 As
evidenced by Indonesia’s “meltdown” at the end of the New Order,
Indonesia’s framework to combat public corruption had failed to work.71 Had
there been a governmental agency entrusted with “isolat[ing] corruption reform
implementation from government bureaucracies that are themselves riddled
with corruption,” and put “dedicated professional commitment” to the object of
curbing public corruption, then perhaps Suharto and his inner circle’s powers
would have not remained unchecked, and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998 as
well as the ensuing riots would have failed to occur.72

65

Id. at 130.
Id.
67 Id. at 131.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 132.
70 Id. at 131–32.
71 See supra Part I.A.
72 Leslie Gielow Jacobs & Benjamin B. Wagner, Limits to the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission
Model of Corruption Reform: Lessons from Indonesia, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 327,
329 (2007).
66
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C. Room for Improvement: Public Corruption in Indonesia in the Era of
Reformasi
In contrast to the end of the New Order, the era of Reformasi has spurred
economic change characterized as a “miracle”;73 however, Indonesia’s
problems with public corruption continue to be widespread. As of September
2009, Indonesia is, for the most part, a peaceful democracy,74 with its economy
growing at a respectable rate—yielding a gross domestic product of 6.1% in
2008.75 Current President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is the man accredited
for “Indonesia’s rise,”76 and has achieved international popularity for being a
“man of principle.”77 Yudhoyono’s popularity is based on five years of steady
economic growth, reform of bureaucracy within Indonesia,78 and a tough anticorruption drive that has become the cornerstone of his campaign.79
Despite Yudhoyono’s tough anti-corruption drive, Indonesia’s
infrastructure is still in need of an overhaul—millions currently live in poverty,
and public corruption remains pervasive.80 For instance, the 2009 CPI ranked
Indonesia 111 out of a total of a 180 countries, a ranking below infamously
corrupt countries like Liberia, Egypt, and mainland China.81
Although curbing public corruption is at the heart of the Reformasi agenda,
many corrupt Indonesian officials have yet to be held accountable for their acts
of misappropriation, demonstrating a lack of effective reform in the public
corruption arena.82 For instance, when the Indonesian government began
investigating Suharto’s acts of public corruption in 2006, these investigations
73

Indonesia’s Future: A Golden Opportunity, supra note 55.
Id.
75 Vladimir Gonzales, Indonesia Economy: GDP Drop Expected Due to Decline in Exports,
ECONOMYWATCH (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/indonesia/Indonesia_
Economy_GDP_Drop_Expected_due_to_Decline_in_Exports.html.
76 See Ishaan Tharoor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono: The Man Behind Indonesia’s Rise, TIME, July 10,
2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1909590,00.html.
77 Profile: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, BBC NEWS (July 9, 2009, 6:50 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
asia-pacific/8127421.stm.
78 Indonesia’s Yudhoyono Wins Second Term, ALARABIYA.NET (July 8, 2009), http://www.alarabiya.net/
articles/2009/07/08/78152.html.
79 A Special Report on Indonesia: A Golden Chance, supra note 54.
80 Id.
81 Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, supra note 4.
82 See Indonesia Country Profile: Judicial System, BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, http://www.
business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/indonesia/corruption-levels/judicial-system
(last visited Jan. 29, 2011); Kayleigh Shebs, Indonesia Court Dismisses Corruption Suit Against Suharto Son,
JURIST (Feb. 11, 2009, 12:06 PM), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/02/indonesia-court-dismissescorruption.php.
74
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ceased as soon as a court-appointed doctor announced Suharto could not stand
trial because of health concerns.83 Suharto was never held accountable for his
misappropriation of Indonesian funds, even after his death.84 In another
example, Tommy Suharto, the former president’s son, went into hiding in 2000
after receiving an eighteen-month sentence on a corruption charge.85 While a
fugitive, he paid two hit men to execute the Indonesian Supreme Court Judge
who sentenced him.86 He was then sentenced to fifteen years in prison for
murder; however, he was released in 2006 for “good behaviour.”87
Furthermore, in 2009, Tommy Suharto was indicted for misappropriating over
$300 million of the government’s money when he illegally sold a state-owned
car company.88 However, the corruption lawsuit he faced was dismissed for
reasons unknown.89
Public corruption reform plays a major role in Indonesia’s overall
economic reform efforts.90 If Indonesia has a reliable government and legal
system, potential new investors will be better able to assess investment risks in
Indonesia.91 Reliable governments and legal systems have a higher probability
of attracting foreign investors into a given country.92 Foreign investment turns
into increased purchasing power that, in turn, leads to greater economic
growth—which is essential to a country’s political and economic stability.93
Governments and legal systems cannot be reliable when faced with rampant
public corruption.94 Therefore, curbing public corruption is imperative for
Indonesia’s overall growth and stability. Many times, anti-corruption agencies
are utilized to address this endemic problem.

83 See Indonesian Minister Says Suharto’s Health Not Improving, CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM (Jan. 9,
2008), http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/321504/1/.html.
84 Kathy Marks, Suharto, Tyrant of Indonesia, Dies Without Facing Justice, INDEPENDENT (London),
Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/suharto-tyrant-of-indonesia-dies-without-facingjustice-774868.html.
85 Indonesia Country Profile: Judicial System, supra note 82.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Shebs, supra note 82.
89 See id.
90 Ira Eddymurthy & Darrell R. Johnson, Indonesia: Doing Business in Indonesia—The Road to Reform:
Achievements to Date, Challenges Ahead (An Overview of Challenges in the Legal Sector), MONDAQ (Dec. 7,
2004), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=29859.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See id.
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II. INDONESIA ADOPTS THE CENTRALIZED ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY
APPROACH TO COMBATING PUBLIC CORRUPTION AS PART OF ITS REFORMASI
AGENDA
Due to Indonesia’s problems in combating public corruption, the
Indonesian government decided it was necessary to adopt a stronger anticorruption strategy in the midst of the Reformasi era.95 In 2003, Indonesia
created the KPK, an anti-corruption agency, to assist in its efforts for reform.96
Upon Indonesia’s ratification of the UNCAC in 2006, Indonesia solidified its
commitment to maintain this anti-corruption agency.97 As Article 36 of the
UNCAC states, each country “shall . . . ensure the existence of a body or
bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption . . . . Such body . . . shall
be granted the necessary independence.”98
Generally speaking, there are two ways Indonesia can continue to fulfill
this UNCAC provision: either through the adoption of a multi-agency strategy,
where power is spread across multiple agencies; or a centralized anticorruption agency strategy, where a multitude of anti-corruption functions are
housed under one single agency.99 The KPK is currently organized under the
centralized agency approach.100
Before determining how the KPK should be reformed, it is important to
first analyze both approaches to combating corruption via the use of an agency.
First, this Part analyzes the centralized anti-corruption agency and multiagency approaches towards public corruption using two case studies that
illustrate these strategies in action. Second, this Part discusses the KPK’s
current framework in further detail.
A. The Multi-Agency Approach Towards Public Corruption
Many countries, including the United States and India, have chosen to
adopt the multi-agency strategy to curb public corruption.101 Multi-agency
approaches to combat corruption are characterized by “cross-cutting agencies”
95 See Sofie Arjon Schütte, Government Policies and Civil Society Initiatives Against Corruption, in
DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA 81, 85–87 (Marco Bünte & Andreas Ufen eds., 2009).
96 Id. at 90.
97 UNCAC, supra note 21, art. 36.
98 Id.
99 See Patrick Meagher, Anti-corruption Agencies: Rhetoric Versus Reality, 8 J. ECON. POL’Y REFORM
69, 70–73 (2005).
100 Jacobs & Wagner, supra note 72, at 328–31.
101 See Meagher, supra note 99, at 70–72.
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that investigate, prevent, and educate the public sector on corruption.102 Under
a multi-agency model, there is no centralized, powerful agency—instead,
traditional judicial and administrative functions retain their core capabilities
and autonomy, while other structures are put into place to “address gaps,
weaknesses, and newly emerged opportunities for corruption.”103 One
successful example of a multi-agency strategy in action is the Office of
Government Ethics (“OGE”) in the United States.104
The United States has adopted a multi-agency approach to curb
corruption.105 There is no single, powerful agency to combat corruption;
however, the Office of Government Ethics, a government agency, is an
example of the multi-agency approach adopted within the executive branch of
the United States.106 The OGE addresses weaknesses and opportunities for
corruption while acknowledging other agencies’ independence and
autonomy.107 Agencies that mirror the OGE also exist within the United
States’s judicial and legislative branches.108 The OGE’s mandate
includes establishing executive branch standards of conduct, issuing
rules and regulations interpreting the criminal conflict of interest
restrictions, establishing the framework for the public and
confidential financial disclosure systems for executive branch
employees, developing training and education programs for use by
executive branch ethics officials and employees, and supporting and
then reviewing individual agency ethics programs to ensure they are
109
functioning properly.

The OGE has three main branches: the Program Services Division, the
Program Review Division, and the Education Division.110 Under the Program
Services Division, each agency within the Executive Branch “is assigned an
OGE Desk Officer who is responsible for providing assistance in maintaining
effective ethics programs.”111 The Program Services Division also manages an
102

HEILBRUNN, supra note 10, at 9.
Meagher, supra note 99, at 70–71.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 71.
107 Office of International Assistance and Government Initiatives, U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS,
http://www.usoge.gov/international/international.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
108 Agency Program Services, U.S. OFF. GOV’T ETHICS, http://www.usoge.gov/about/agency_
program_services.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
109 Office of International Assistance and Government Initiatives, supra note 107.
110 Agency Program Services, supra note 108.
111 Id.
103
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annual public financial disclosure reporting system for senior officials within
the Executive Branch, including about 1000 Presidential Appointees and 125
Designated Agency Ethics Officials.112 Under the public financial disclosure
system, these senior officials must report information regarding their income
and assets, financial transactions, gifts, liabilities, and any other sources of
compensation greater than $5000.113 These reports are made available to the
general public and media, which ultimately ensures transparency.114
The Program Review Division conducts on-site ethics program reviews of
executive governmental agencies and evaluates whether an agency has an
effective ethics program.115 If any deficiencies are found, that agency must
confirm within a sixty-day period that corrective action is being taken pursuant
to the Program Review Division’s recommendations.116 Lastly, the Education
Division develops and provides ethics training courses, workshops, and
seminars for Executive Branch agencies.117
The OGE is relatively small for a U.S. agency, with just over seventy
employees.118 Unlike centralized anti-corruption agencies, the OGE does not
have investigative or prosecutorial functions,119 but mainly serves to inform the
public and Executive Branch on actions that might represent conflicts of
interest.120
B. The Centralized Anti-Corruption Agency Paradigm
Over the past twenty years, more than thirty countries have established
some form of a centralized anti-corruption agency to assist in efforts to combat
corruption,121 including Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Australian

112

Id.
Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Background and Mission, U.S. OFF. GOV’T ETHICS, http://www.usoge.gov/about/background_
mission.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
119 HEILBRUNN, supra note 10, at 10.
120 Id.
121 PATRICK MEAGHER & CARYN VOLAND, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES
(ACAS): OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAM BRIEF 4 (2006) [hereinafter
USAID], available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/ACA_
508c.pdf.
113
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State of New South Wales.122 A centralized anti-corruption agency is defined
as “a separate, permanent government agency whose primary function is to
provide centralized leadership in core areas of anti-corruption activity.”123
What makes centralized anti-corruption agencies unique is the multitude of
functions housed under one agency. Centralized anti-corruption agencies
usually perform some, if not all, of the following duties: “1. Receiving and
responding to complaints; 2. Intelligence gathering, monitoring, and
investigation; 3. Prosecutions and administrative orders; 4. Research, analysis,
and technical assistance; 5. Ethics policy guidance, compliance review, and
scrutiny of asset declarations; and 6. Public information, education and
outreach.”124
It must be stressed that a centralized anti-corruption agency approach does
not require that all anti-corruption functions be placed under a single agency,
but instead that a number of key responsibilities and roles are placed under a
single entity, thereby creating a powerful agency to lead the fight against
corruption.125 In contrast, the multi-agency approach “avoids setting up a
strong ‘lead’ agency in the anti-corruption field, thus posing a lower risk than
the single-agency approach of upsetting the balance and separation of
governmental powers.”126 However, both the multi-agency and single-agency
strategies required interaction with other entities that combat corruption,
including police investigators, courts, and members of the judiciary.127
Centralized anti-corruption agencies tend to be created when “‘corruption
has spread so widely and the police are so corrupt that offences of bribery are
no longer investigated or prosecuted.’”128 They are also adopted when a “crisis
of legitimacy” has occurred, leading to political instability, and thus, decreased
foreign investment in a particular country.129 Thus, the country turns to
122 Max J. Skidmore, Promise and Peril in Combating Corruption: Hong Kong’s ICAC, 547 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 118, 122 (1996).
123 USAID, supra note 121, at 5.
124 Id.
125 Meagher, supra note 99, at 70.
126 Id. at 72.
127 See HEILBRUNN, supra note 10, at 10.
128 Nicholas Charron, Mapping and Measuring the Impact of Anti-Corruption Agencies: A New Dataset
for 18 Countries 2 (Nov. 20, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (quoting Bertrand de Speville, Failing AntiCorruption Agencies–Causes and Cures (May 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript)), available at
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/working_papers/SOG%20papers/Charron%20-%20SOG%20Conference%
20Nov08.pdf.
129 See, e.g., Meagher, supra note 99, at 72.
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establishing a single anti-corruption agency—perceived as a “new and
different” response to the problem of corruption.130 Hong Kong’s anticorruption agency serves as an illustration of the centralized agency strategy.
In 1974, Hong Kong established the Independent Commission Against
Corruption (“ICAC”), a centralized anti-corruption agency, which eliminated
much of Hong Kong’s corruption and changed public attitudes regarding
corruption.131 The KPK is roughly modeled after the ICAC.132
The ICAC was created after Hong Kong’s riots in 1966, which stemmed
from economic inequalities and widespread poverty.133 Like Indonesia, Hong
Kong’s political instability was attributable to public corruption.134 When
Hong Kong established the ICAC, its main concern was curbing the systemic
police corruption that facilitated illicit activities such as drug trafficking and
prostitution.135
The ICAC “‘quickly proved embarrassingly successful.’”136 The ICAC
began arresting numerous corrupt police officers; however, this resulted in
mounting tensions between the two agencies.137 In 1977, these tensions
culminated in police retaliation when the police raided the ICAC’s main office
and assaulted members of the staff.138 After this incident, the ICAC agreed to
grant partial amnesty for minor corrupt acts committed within the police force
before 1977.139 Although some high profile police officers were still tried and
convicted, the ICAC decided to force the majority into early retirement.140 As
an effect, tensions between the ICAC and the police force have dissipated.141
Today, the ICAC has about 1200 staff members, which is a substantial
number when considering that Hong Kong’s population is just over seven
130

Id.
Skidmore, supra note 122, at 122.
132 DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GTZ) UNCAC PROJECT,
IMPLEMENTING THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION: ANTI-CORRUPTION CLEARING HOUSE IN THE
CORRUPTION ERADICATION COMMISSION (KPK) 1 (2006) [hereinafter GTZ UNCAC PROJECT], available at
http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/gtz-en-factsheet-clearing-house-indonesia-2007.pdf.
133 Skidmore, supra note 122, at 121.
134 See Jacobs & Wagner, supra note 72, at 330.
135 Meagher, supra note 99, at 72.
136 Skidmore, supra note 122, at 123 (quoting FRANK WELSH, A HISTORY OF HONG KONG 492 (1993)).
137 Id. at 123.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See id.
141 See id.
131
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million people.142 The Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance
established the ICAC,143 enabling the agency to fight corruption through a
three-pronged approach involving law enforcement, prevention, and
education.144 As the largest body of the ICAC,145 the Operations Department
covers law enforcement; accordingly, its primary duty is to investigate
corruption offenses.146 The Corruption Prevention Department examines
practices and procedures of governmental agencies and provides them with
ethical guidelines,147 much like the Program Review Division of the OGE. The
Corruption Prevention Department also offers free corruption prevention
advice to private organizations upon request.148 Lastly, the Community
Relations Department is responsible for educating Hong Kong’s public on the
“evils of corruption” by launching commercials to enlist and foster public
support.149
The Operations Department has wide investigatory powers, broader than
the traditional police powers of search, seizure, arrest, and detention.150 A
reason why the ICAC has attained its level of success is due to its investigatory
powers being in excess of what is customary in liberal democracies, like in the
United States.151 For instance, Operations Department officers may arrest a
person without a warrant if “‘they reasonably suspect’” that a person is guilty
of a corruption offense.152 Officers may confiscate suspects’ travel documents
to ensure they do not leave Hong Kong.153 Officers may also conduct a search
via a warrant signed by their Commissioner instead of a neutral and detached
magistrate.154 Officers may check any suspect’s financial records—a critical
142 Organisation
Structure,
HONG
KONG
ICAC,
http://www.icac.org.hk/en/about_icac/os/
index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
143 HEILBRUNN, supra note 10, at 3.
144 Organisation Structure, supra note 142.
145 HEILBRUNN, supra note 10, at 4.
146 Organisation Structure, supra note 142.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Tony KWOK Man-wai, Formulating an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy–The Experience of Hong
Kong ICAC, in ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2005 AND RESOURCE MATERIAL 196, 200 (United Nations Asia & Far E.
Inst., Annual Report Ser. No. 69, 2006), available at http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no69/
16_P196-201.pdf.
151 See Skidmore, supra note 122, at 125–26.
152 Id. at 125 (quoting Anoop Gulab Gidwani, The Impact and Accountability Implications of the Bill of
Rights in Relation to the Independent Commission Against Corruption 60 (1994) (unpublished M.P.A. thesis,
University of Hong Kong)).
153 Man-wai, supra note 150, at 200.
154 Skidmore, supra note 122, at 126.
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function needed to prosecute corrupt offenders.155 Furthermore, the ICAC has
the power to require witnesses to answer questions under oath.156
To prevent potential abuses in power, the ICAC has an Operations Review
Committee whose members mostly come from the private sector and are
appointed by the executive.157 The Committee is responsible for reviewing
every single report the ICAC issues to ensure there is no “‘whitewashing.’”158
Additionally, the Operations Review Committee must “pursu[e] all corruption
allegations without a priori selection criteria—although it is within the sole
discretion of the Attorney General to decide which cases to prosecute.”159
Lastly, the ICAC has an “‘internal monitoring system’” that is “‘so secretive
that few in the Commission know how it works.’”160
C. Indonesia’s Centralized Anti-corruption Strategy: The KPK
Because of its crisis of legitimacy,161 Indonesia adopted the centralized
anti-corruption agency strategy in an effort to curb public corruption and
attract foreign investment.162 Law Number 30 of 2002163 officially created
Indonesia’s centralized anti-corruption agency, the KPK, which is roughly
modeled after the ICAC.164
Law Number 30’s preamble states that corruption is an “extraordinary
problem, that needs to be tackled by extraordinary means.”165 The explanatory
memorandum to Law Number 30 makes clear that the KPK was designed as a
corruption superbody with a far-reaching mandate.166 Article 6 of Law Number
30 established the KPK’s primary roles, which include: (1) coordination with
other agencies responsible for eradicating corruption; (2) supervision of these
155

Id. at 125.
Man-wai, supra note 150, at 200.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Meagher, supra note 99, at 90.
160 Skidmore, supra note 122, at 126.
161 See supra Part I.A.
162 Law on the Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption (UU RI No. 30/2002)
(Indon.) [hereinafter Law No. 30 of 2002], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/11/39840517.
pdf?contentId=39840518.
163 Id.
164 GTZ UNCAC PROJECT, supra note 132, at 1.
165 Schütte, supra note 95, at 90.
166 See Stewart Fenwick, Measuring Up? Indonesia’s Anti-corruption Commission and the New
Corruption Agenda, in INDONESIA LAW AND SOCIETY 406, 407 (Tim Lindsey ed., 2d ed. 2008); see also Law
No. 30 of 2002, supra note 162, at 1.
156
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other agencies; (3) conducting corruption prevention activities; (4)
investigating and prosecuting corrupt acts; and (5) monitoring state
administration.167 Thus, Article 6 gave the KPK broad powers of investigation,
prevention, and prosecution.168 Additionally, it is important to note that
although part of the KPK’s mandate is prevention, it focuses on investigations
and prosecutions.169
Law Number 30 gave the KPK significant law enforcement coordination
powers.170 This legislation empowered the KPK to take cases away from the
National Police and Attorney General’s Office in a variety of circumstances:
when there are delays in handling a complaint; when case management is
directed towards protecting the accused or itself contains elements of
corruption; when interference from legislative, executive, or judicial
authorities hampers the investigation; or when police or prosecutors throw out
a case without good cause.171
To fulfill these broad responsibilities, the legislation gave the KPK legal
powers to investigate and prosecute; the authority to tap and record a suspect’s
communications; the power to investigate a suspect’s bank accounts; the
authority to prevent Indonesian suspects from traveling abroad; and the ability
to inquire into the wealth and taxation affairs of suspects.172 Additionally, the
KPK has surveillance equipment and other state-of-the-art technology to assist
in investigations.173
Mechanisms are in place to ensure that the KPK’s staff retain personal
integrity and do not become corrupt. Under Law Number 30, the KPK is
responsible for managing its own personnel, including appointing and
terminating contracts.174 Thus, the KPK appoints, as well as dismisses,

167

Law No. 30 of 2002, supra note 162, art. 6.
Also, the KPK and ICAC differ in that the ICAC addresses public corruption in the private sector,
whereas the KPK combats only public sector corruption. Law No. 30 of 2002, supra note 162, art. 11.
Additionally, the ICAC has powers of investigation and prevention, whereas the KPK has a broader mandate
of prevention, investigations, and prosecutions. See Man-wai, supra note 150, at 198; see also Wagner &
Jacobs, supra note 33, at 213 n.105.
169 Jacobs & Wagner, supra note 72, at 329.
170 See Fenwick, supra note 166, at 408.
171 KPK: The Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia, supra note 11.
172 See Schütte, supra note 95, at 90; see also Wagner & Jacobs, supra note 33, at 213 n.105.
173 Jeremy Kingsley, D-Day for Anti-Corruption Reform, INSIDE INDON., Apr.–June 2009, http://www.
insideindonesia.org/edition-96/d-day-for-anti-corruption-reform.
174 Indonesia: Integrity Scorecard Report, GLOBAL INTEGRITY, http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/
2006/INDONESIA/scorecard.cfm?subcategoryID=91&countryID=15 (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
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investigators, prosecutors, and other staff members.175 Law Number 30
temporarily suspends a commissioner suspected of committing any criminal
act until absolved of guilt.176
Law Number 30 specifies that the KPK must comply with a series of
mandatory deadlines when a corruption case emerges under the agency’s
jurisdiction.177 The legislation institutes deadlines for the preparation of an
indictment and for reporting the identification of sufficient evidence for a
case.178 These deadlines reduce the potential delay of a corruption lawsuit,
often due to lack of diligence or commitment, outside influences, or fear of
retribution.179
Interestingly, Law Number 30 institutes an absolute requirement that all
investigations initiated by the KPK proceed to prosecution.180 This legislation
reverses the traditional prosecutorial discretion, which allows plea bargains
and the dismissal of charges.181 Due to a wide perception that the Chief
Prosecutor misused prosecutorial discretion in previous corruption cases,182
“[t]hese constraints limit the temptation to succumb to corrupt advances from
defendants seeking a reduction or withdrawal of charges, and ensure that KPK
prosecutors only initiate cases backed by solid evidence.”183
The KPK functions independently even though it is a state agency reporting
to the President, the Indonesian Parliament (“Parliament”), and the Auditor
General.184 According to Law Number 30, the KPK is the chief entity
responsible for coordinating with the Attorney General’s Office, the National
Police, and other entities active in fighting corruption.185 Additionally, the
KPK staff is encouraged to undergo further training and education to refine
members’ personal skills, and the staff receives better pay than other branches

175

Law No. 30 of 2002, supra note 162, arts. 21–26.
Id. art. 32.
177 See Fenwick, supra note 166, at 411.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Kingsley, supra note 173.
182 See Fenwick, supra note 166, at 410.
183 Kingsley, supra note 173.
184 GTZ UNCAC PROJECT, supra note 132, at 1.
185 See CORRUPTION ERADICATION COMM’N OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDON., GAP ANALYSIS STUDY REPORT:
IDENTIFICATION OF GAP BETWEEN LAWS/REGULATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 75 (2006) [hereinafter GAP ANALYSIS], available at
http://www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/document/literature/UNCAC-Gap-Analysis-Indonesia.pdf.
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of the Indonesian government.186 Theoretically, the KPK seems to be the
“ultimate institutional response” to corruption; however, the KPK may not
achieve this goal in practice.187
III. INDONESIA’S INADEQUACIES IN LAW, CROSS-AGENCY COOPERATION, AND
POLITICAL WILL MUST BE ADDRESSED TO IMPROVE ITS ANTI-CORRUPTION
AGENCY’S POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS
Although intended as the “ultimate institutional response” to corruption,
many centralized anti-corruption agencies carry a high probability for
failure.188 The KPK is no exception. Accordingly, the KPK should strengthen
its laws, cross-agency cooperation, and political will to improve its anticorruption agency’s possibility of success.
Theoretically, anti-corruption agencies are provided with “a team of
experts . . . an ample mandate, investigative powers, statutory autonomy and
adequate funding to ensure that effective preventive steps are identified and put
in place. In practice, however, the label ‘ACA’ [Anti-Corruption Agency] does
not fit many of the realities found.”189 From 2003 to 2009, the KPK has
investigated, prosecuted, and achieved a 100% conviction rate in eighty-six
cases of bribery and graft related to government procurements and budgets.190
The KPK won global praise for its prosecutorial accomplishments, which
bolstered the KPK’s image and Indonesia’s overall image.191 Despite the
KPK’s impressive conviction record, these convictions are not necessarily
determinative of its prospects of long-term success.

186

Kingsley, supra note 173.
Luís de Sousa, Anti-corruption Agencies: Between Empowerment and Irrelevance, 53 CRIME, L. &
SOC. CHANGE 5, 6 (2010).
188 Id. at 5–22.
189 Id. at 7.
190 Onishi, supra note 12.
191 Mr. Clean’s Battered Broom, ECONOMIST (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.economist.com/world/asia/
displaystory.cfm?story_id=14587280. In one noteworthy case, the KPK convicted the former president of the
Bank of Indonesia, Indonesia’s central bank, of embezzling $10 million, leading to the arrest of the bank’s
former deputy governor who, coincidentally, was Yudhoyono’s in-law. See Indonesia Country Profile: Public
Anti-corruption Initiatives, BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/
country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/indonesia/initiatives/public-anti-corruption-initiatives/ (last visited Jan.
29, 2011). This demonstrates that the political elite are no longer shielded like they were in the New Order
under the Suharto regime. See Onishi, supra note 12.
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Regardless of whether the multi-agency or centralized-agency approach is
adopted, a lack of political will,192 inadequate corruption laws,193 and poor
cross-agency cooperation194 are factors that determine an anti-corruption
agency’s prospects of long-term success. First, this Part discusses Indonesia’s
corruption laws and the gaps within those laws that need to be addressed. This
is significant because an anti-corruption agency cannot hope to reduce public
sector venality without the appropriate legal tools in place.195 Second, this Part
discusses the poor cross-agency cooperation of key Indonesian corruptionfighting agencies such as the KPK, the Attorney General’s Office, and the
National Police. This is important because the success of an anti-corruption
agency depends “to a large degree on cooperation from sister agencies.”196
Third, this Part discusses Indonesia’s recent drop in political will in fighting
corruption. Without a government “seriously committed” to fighting this
endemic problem, an anti-corruption agency may not survive.197 Strengthening
Indonesia’s political will, cross-agency cooperation, and corruption laws
increases the probability that an anti-corruption agency will achieve long-term
success and true Reformasi will occur.
A. Inadequate Corruption Laws Will Prevent an Anti-corruption Agency from
Achieving Desired Reform.
Regardless of whether Indonesia adopts a multi-agency or centralizedagency strategy, Indonesia’s inadequate anti-corruption laws will definitively
hinder the KPK’s efforts to curb public corruption; therefore, Indonesia must
institute better corruption laws for a better probability of corruption reform.198
This Subpart analyzes current Indonesian corruption laws in detail and then
utilizes the UNCAC articles to conduct a gap analysis in Indonesian law.
1. Corruption Laws After the New Order
Although corruption laws existed in Indonesia during the New Order, after
Suharto resigned as President, the Indonesian legislature eventually adopted
192 Fumiko Nagano, A Gecko Challenging a Crocodile: Anti-corruption Agency vs. Vested Interests,
COMMGAP (July 30, 2009, 10:24 AM), http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/gecko-challenging-crocodileanti-corruption-agency-vs-vested-interests.
193 HEILBRUNN, supra note 10, at 1–3.
194 USAID, supra note 121, at 7.
195 HEILBRUNN, supra note 10, at 1–3.
196 USAID, supra note 121, at 8 tbl.1.
197 Id. at 5.
198 See id at 8–9.
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stronger corruption laws.199 It passed anti-corruption legislation in 1999 and
2001.200 These laws supplanted Law Number 3 of 1971, which had been in
force for approximately twenty-eight years.201 As the preamble of Law
Number 31 of 1999 states:
Law No. 3 of 1971 . . . is not in line any longer with the legal needs
of society. For that reason, it is deemed necessary to replace it with
the Law on Eradication of Criminal Act of Corruption, which is
expected to be more effective in preventing and eradicating the
202
criminal act of corruption.

Law Number 31 of 1999 defines corruption as involving “[a]nyone who
illegally commits an act to enrich oneself or another person or a corporation,
thereby creating losses to the state finance or state economy.”203 Because of
Law Number 31, thirty types of offenses are punishable as corruption,
including bribery, embezzlement, extortion, fraud in procurement, conflict of
interest in procurement, acceptance of an undue gift, and loss to the state.204
Law Number 31 imposes criminal penalties for corruption, including prison
with terms ranging from four years to life.205 Law Number 31 institutes severe
financial penalties for corrupt acts, proscribing a maximum penalty of one
billion rupiah.206 Law Number 31 also mandates that cases involving
corruption have priority over other cases to ensure “prompt settlement.”207
However, Law Number 31 does not forbid bribing foreign officials, nor does it
include provisions for corruption in the private sector.208
Law Number 31 can be seen as an effort to address concerns regarding the
Attorney General’s and Chief Prosecutor’s track record in combating
corruption. Studies show the offices of the Attorney General and Chief

199

Wagner & Jacobs, supra note 33, at 199.
Id. at 203.
201 Mieke Komar, Challenging Corruption in Indonesia 2 (May 4, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.iawj.org/what/Session2Komar.doc.
202 Law on the Eradication of the Criminal Act of Corruption pmbl. (UU RI No. 31/1999) (Indon.),
[hereinafter Law No. 31 of 1999], available at http://assetrecovery.org/kc/resources/org.apache.wicket.
Application/repo?nid=b97a20d1-a342-11dc-bf1b-335d0754ba85.
203 Id. art. 2.
204 See id.
205 Id.
206 Id. As of February 2011, one billion Indonesian rupiah is equal to $110,864.74 USD. See Indonesia
Rupiahs to United States Dollars Rate, XE, http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi?Amount=1%2C000%
2C000%2C000&From=IDR&To=USD (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
207 Law No. 31 of 1999, supra note 202, art. 25.
208 Indonesia Country Profile: Public Anti-corruption Initiatives, supra note 191.
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Prosecutor performed poorly at investigating and prosecuting corruption and
retrieving assets.209
In 2001, the Indonesian government amended Law Number 31 by way of
Law Number 20.210 This law broadened and clarified the definition of
corruption, as well as increased relevant penalties.211 Law Number 20
criminalized passive corruption in the public sector, extortion, and money
laundering.212 Although Indonesia has basic corruption laws in place, better
corruption laws may be necessary for an anti-corruption agency to function
effectively.
2. The Identification of Deficiencies in Indonesian Corruption Law
The UNCAC’s mandatory and non-mandatory provisions may be used as a
tool to determine areas where Indonesian domestic corruption law needs
improvement.213 Because Indonesia has ratified the UNCAC, and intends to
use the treaty as a standard for eradicating corruption both domestically and
internationally,214 it is an appropriate benchmarking tool that can identify
deficiencies in Indonesian corruption law. By the utilization of the UNCAC, it
is clear that the Indonesian legislature needs to improve witness protection,
whistleblower laws, laws that allow access to financial records, and general
conspiracy laws so that an anti-corruption commission may be able to function
effectively in Indonesia.
a. The Need for Improved Witness Protection and Whistleblower
Immunities
One of the most significant gaps between the UNCAC and Indonesian
domestic law is the protection of witnesses and whistleblowers.215 The
UNCAC mandates protection of witnesses, experts, and victims in Article 32,
stating, “Each State Party shall take appropriate measures . . . to provide
209

See Fenwick, supra note 166, at 407.
Prijono Tjiptoherijanto, Corruption Prevention in Indonesia 10 (May 5, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Emory International Law Review).
211 Id.
212 Indonesia Country Profile: Public Anti-corruption Initiatives, supra note 191.
213 See GAP ANALYSIS, supra note 185, at iii.
214 Amien Sunaryadi, Vice Chairman/Comm’r, Corruption Eradication Comm’n (KPK) of the Rep. of
Indon., Keynote Address at Regional Seminar for Asia-Pacific: Making International Anti-Corruption
Standards Operational: Asset Recovery and Mutual Legal Assistance (Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://www.
baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Bali/Amien_Sunaryadi.pdf.
215 GAP ANALYSIS, supra note 185, at 121–23.
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effective protection from potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses and
experts who give testimony concerning [corrupt activities].”216 Indonesia, in an
effort to conform to the UNCAC mandate, passed Law Number 13 in 2006,
providing physical security to witnesses and victims during a trial
proceeding.217 To enforce such protection, the Indonesian government
instituted a Witness and Protection Body, which is responsible for determining
compensation and restitution for victims.218
Regardless, the UN has expressed concern regarding the implementation of
Law Number 13 due to the lack of training and insufficient funding in law
enforcement.219 Witness protection laws are only successful if sufficient
resources are allocated to enforce the law when necessary.220 Additionally,
Law Number 13 of 2006 uses the same definition of “witness” from its
Criminal Procedure Code, which only grants protection to individuals
providing information on criminal cases.221 Thus, Law Number 13 may
exclude individuals who provide information in civil corruption cases.222
Moreover, Law Number 13 states that a suspect who testifies may not be
acquitted due to his testimony, but the judge may take his cooperation into
account when determining his sentence.223 Thus, this provision is unlikely to
result in a defendant turning on his fellow conspirators. Without appropriate
immunity and sentence-reduction mechanisms, it is unlikely that prosecutors
and the KPK will be able to dismantle networks of corruption.224
Furthermore, Law Number 13 may provide physical witness protection, but
it does not effectively shield whistleblowers from workplace retaliation.225 A
216
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whistleblower is one who reports corruption or fraud within an organization.226
Article 33 of the UNCAC addresses whistleblower protection, stating, “Each
State Party shall consider incorporating . . . measures to provide protection
against any unjustified treatment for any person who reports in good faith and
on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning [acts
of corruption].”227
Although UNCAC Article 33 is not a mandatory provision,228
whistleblower protection laws are integral to curbing public corruption.
Effective whistleblower legislation must not only protect whistleblowers from
physical threats, but exempt them from administrative, civil, or criminal
charges when information is disclosed in good faith.229 Moreover, if a
country’s domestic whistleblower laws offer adequate protection against
workplace retaliation, public servants will be more inclined to report cases of
illegal activity; thus, the government will obtain more information regarding
corrupt acts.230 Therefore, Indonesia must implement legislation and
procedures that protect whistleblowers from retaliation to effectively curb
endemic corruption.
b. Improved Laws Regarding Access to Financial Records
Indonesia must instill better laws regarding access to financial records for
an anti-corruption agency to attain long-term success. As Article 40 of the
UNCAC states, “Each State Party shall ensure that . . . there are appropriate
mechanisms available . . . to overcome obstacles that may arise out of the
application of bank secrecy laws.”231 Inadequate access to bank accounts and
other financial records is a significant barrier when investigating and
prosecuting cases dealing with public corruption.232 As one expert notes:
In the United States, federal investigators and prosecutors have ready
access to financial records through the use of subpoenas issued
through an investigating grand jury. The heart of almost any public
226
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corruption case is the pecuniary benefit flowing to the corrupt
official. If the benefit can be documented in the hands of the official,
the case is half won. Conversely, if the flow of the money to the
defendant or his family or associates cannot be tracked and then
proven at trial, a public corruption prosecution has little prospect of
233
success.

At the time of this Comment’s publication, there is no provision under
Indonesian law stating that production of financial records is mandatory.234
The mere act of requesting financial records is an impediment to effective
enforcement of corruption laws. To request financial records, the Attorney
General, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or the Chief of the National
Police must send a letter of request to Indonesia’s central bank, Bank of
Indonesia.235 This bank then sends a request for production of records from the
appropriate bank.236 This procedure is prone to delays, and there are no
enforcement mechanisms for any governmental agency to resort to if the bank
turns down the request.237 Although Law Number 20 authorizes the KPK238 to
order access to financial records, the KPK is not authorized to sanction banks
for refusing to comply with requests.239 Because access to financial records is
integral to corruption reform, Indonesia must implement legislation that would
enable governmental agencies to obtain financial records when prosecuting or
investigating cases regarding public corruption.
c. Re-implementation of Laws to Ensure a Clean Judiciary in Corruption
Cases
Indonesia must pass legislation that ensures a clean judiciary to improve an
anti-corruption agency’s possibility of success. Article 11 of the UNCAC
requires states parties to “strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for
corruption among members of the judiciary.”240 This is important because in
many developing countries, the judiciary tends to be the weakest link of all the

233
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institutions combating corruption, which, in turn, undermines the credibility of
the entire system.241 Indonesia is no exception.
Law Number 30 of 2002 provided for the creation of the Pengadilan
Tindak Pidana Korupsi, or the Special Corruption Court.242 This court was
essentially a new jurisdiction created to handle corruption cases investigated
by the KPK.243 Presidential Decree Number 59/2004 was issued to facilitate
the establishment of the Special Corruption Court,244 and the court was
formally running in 2003.245 The majority of the Special Corruption Court was
staffed by non-career judges, recruited from a pool of practicing lawyers,
university professors, and retired prosecutors.246 These judges were directly
selected by the KPK,247 and therefore more independent than the traditionally
corrupt Indonesian judiciary.248
In 2009, the Indonesian Parliament passed legislation overturning part of
Law Number 20, effectively dismantling the Special Corruption Court.249 At
the time of this Comment’s publication, Indonesia will have thirty-three
corruption courts at the provincial level, instead of the one Special Corruption
Court at the Jakarta District Court level.250 Consequently, there will be more
than 400 courts at the regencies and municipalities.251 The 2009 legislation
also allows the panel of judges presiding on a corruption case to be staffed
from the traditional corruption case, which is a step backwards from Law
Number 20, which was enacted to ensure a clean judiciary.252 The number and
composition of judges will be determined by the respective head of courts or
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the Supreme Court, depending on the level of each case.253 The 2009
legislation also mandates that all provinces have corrupt crimes courts within
two years.254 Many experts maintain that this two-year deadline will be
impossible to achieve without lowering standards.255
Indonesia needs to either reinstitute the Special Corruption Court or adopt
other measures to ensure a clean judiciary. At the time of this Comment’s
publication, there is no evidence that Indonesia has taken appropriate steps
directed at reducing corruption in the judiciary. Because judges have the ability
to dismiss cases and decide on the admissibility of evidence, a clean judiciary
is essential for an anti-corruption agency to function effectively in Indonesia.
Accordingly, laws ensuring a clean judiciary must be enacted in Indonesia.
d. Adopting a General Conspiracy Law to Dismantle Networks of
Corrupt Offenders
Although not specifically mentioned in the UNCAC, Indonesia should
adopt a general conspiracy law to enable its agencies to effectively combat
public corruption. Conspiracy, or an agreement between two or more parties to
commit an unlawful act,256 is damaging because, by combining their efforts to
engage in a criminal activity, conspirators increase their chances of bringing
about their unlawful goal, make it easier to pursue complex objectives, and
make it more likely that they will expand their horizons to include criminal
activities well beyond the original purpose of the group.257
Public corruption is often characterized by multiple perpetrators who create
large, complex networks to carry out illicit activity.258 Because general
conspiracy laws allow members of a conspiracy to be held vicariously liable
for crimes committed by their co-conspirators in furtherance of a conspiracy,259
prosecutors frequently rely on these laws in corruption cases. At the time of
this Comment’s writing, Indonesia does not have a general conspiracy
provision.260 Furthermore, the KPK has been criticized for only prosecuting
253
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weakened or minor political figures261 instead of disabling complex networks
of public corruption. A general conspiracy provision would allow an anticorruption agency to effectively combat public corruption.
By examining Indonesian domestic corruption law, it is evident that
Indonesia needs better legal tools to combat corruption, including better
witness and whistleblower protection laws, bank secrecy laws, and a general
conspiracy law. An anti-corruption agency cannot prevail when there are
inadequate anti-corruption laws necessary for its success. Changing legislation
can be done with relative ease. However, Indonesia’s other hurdles may be
more difficult to overcome.
B. The Lack of Cross-agency Cooperation: The War of the Geckos Versus the
Crocodiles
Due to a lack of cross-agency cooperation, Indonesia’s anti-corruption
agency may not be able to achieve long-term success.262 Cooperation is needed
from other agencies for an anti-corruption agency to function effectively.
Without it, there is a duplication of efforts from different agencies, which
translates into a drain on a country’s financial resources. Because of the
tensions between Indonesia’s National Police, the Attorney General’s Office,
and the KPK, it is evident that serious problems in cross-agency cooperation
exist; thus, the KPK is hindered from achieving long-term success.
1. Problems with Coordination Between Agencies
The problem with cross-agency coordination is exemplified by the KPK
coming under attack from the Indonesian National Police and the Attorney
General’s Office in 2009.263 In July 2009, the National Chief of Detectives
declared war on the KPK during a nationally broadcast interview.264 The police
chief likened the KPK to a “stupid gecko” for attempting to challenge the
“crocodile” of the police force,265 creating what can be referred to as the war of
the geckos versus the crocodiles.266
261
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This war is exemplified by two cases. In one case, two KPK deputy
chairmen were accused of, then later arrested by the National Police Chief and
Attorney General for, allegedly soliciting bribes from a corruption suspect so
that the suspect could flee abroad.267 Soon after Yudhoyono announced an
official investigation, wiretapped conversations compiled by the KPK were
broadcast on a nationally televised court hearing.268 The wiretapped
conversations featured a high-ranking state prosecutor and a police witness
stating that there was a conspiracy to frame the two KPK officials in this
case.269 Within hours of the broadcast, the two deputy chairmen were released
from jail but nonetheless remained under investigation.270
In another case, the Head Commissioner of the KPK, Antasari Azhar, went
on trial in 2009 for “allegedly masterminding the drive-by shooting of a
businessman,” motivated by their mutual love interest—a golf caddy.271
However, in November 2009, it was found that a senior police officer from the
National Police conspired to frame Azhar for the murder.272 According to the
senior police officer, the National Police Chief directly issued the order to kill
the businessman and ordered deputies to compile a dossier to frame Azhar.273
In December 2009, the KPK attempted to arrange a meeting with both the
Attorney General and the National Police Chief to coordinate activities
concerning investigations so as to avoid any possible overlap.274 The Attorney
General and National Police Chief cancelled the meeting due to “other
activities.”275 As of March 2010, the head officials of the Attorney General’s
Office and the National Police have failed to meet with the KPK.276
On one hand, the tensions and lack of coordination between the Attorney
General’s Office, the National Police, and the KPK are understandable. These
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departments have overlapping mandates, competing agendas, and generally, an
institutional lack of clarity.277 Additionally, the fact that the KPK diverts
personnel resources from the National Police and Attorney General’s Office is
problematic.278 Attorney General prosecutors and National Police investigators
of the highest “competence and integrity” are routinely pulled from their
respective agencies to work for the KPK.279 This practice not only results in a
decrease in morale in these agencies, but weakens the institutions as well—
leaving them more corrupt than ever before.280
Some believe that a rivalry between the Attorney General, the National
Police, and the KPK can be construed in a positive light, because each agency
is “‘forced to perform their best . . . otherwise they will be quickly spotted by
the public as incompetent.’”281 However, in reality, close coordination between
the agencies is needed for meaningful corruption reform to occur. Thus, for
Indonesia’s anti-corruption agency to function effectively, problems with
coordination must be addressed.
2. Solutions to the Problem of Coordination Between Agencies.
Although the KPK has problems with coordination with other Indonesian
agencies, there are certain measures the Indonesian government can take to
address these issues. Regardless of whether the multi-agency model or
centralized model towards corruption reform is implemented, the KPK can
adopt a stronger preventive approach to improve cross-agency coordination.
First, it is important to note that other countries’ anti-corruption agencies
have overcome problems with coordination with other governmental
agencies.282 For instance, to reduce animosity from the Hong Kong police in
the 1970s, the ICAC dropped petty corruption charges for some police
officers.283 Other officers who had high-profile cases were forced into early
retirement instead of being punished to the full extent of the law.284 Although
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this is not the most ideal of circumstances,285 the KPK may want to consider
extending a similar olive branch to the Attorney General’s Office and the
National Police—but only as a one-time occurrence. This may enable the
agencies to start with a blank slate and may cause animosities to dissipate.
However, this is only to be a short-term solution towards problems of
coordination—for long-term success, a more comprehensive approach needs to
be established. One solution is for the KPK to establish a stronger preventive
program. As of February 2011, the KPK does not take on a major role in
ensuring that other governmental agencies have good ethical programs in
place—instead, there has been a pronounced emphasis on conducting
investigations and prosecutions.286 Perhaps if the KPK adopts a stronger
preventive approach, much like the United States’s OGE or Hong Kong’s
ICAC, better coordination may be achieved.
For instance, the KPK can create a new division, similar to the United
States’s OGE Program Review Division, which is entrusted with conducting
on-site ethics program reviews of governmental agencies.287 Therefore, when
the KPK identifies a deficiency within a governmental agency, the
governmental agency would be required to take action pursuant to the KPK’s
recommendations. Additionally, the KPK should create ethics training
programs for each agency. Eventually, the government agency’s perception of
corruption would change by officers realizing the importance of cross-agency
cooperation. However, the Indonesian government must also create a legal
duty for each governmental agency to cooperate with the KPK. Therefore, if
recommendations are not followed, sanctions or remedial action may be taken
against the non-compliant governmental agency. Legal obligations forcing
governmental agencies to cooperate with anti-corruption agencies have been
imposed in Hong Kong and Singapore and have been successful.288
Other tools may prove to be useful in the KPK’s efforts for improved crossagency cooperation. The Indonesian government needs to provide clear
285 The tensions are a product of the KPK arresting prosecutors and police officers. The Crimebuster and
the Caddy, supra note 271. “The more corrupt officials that are sent to jail, the more enemies the KPK creates,
because corrupt officials in Indonesia are countless.” Titus Jonathan, Letter: Who is Trying to Kill the KPK?,
JAKARTA POST (Nov. 14, 2009, 3:53 PM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/11/14/letter-who-tryingkill-kpk.html.
286 See Jacobs & Wagner, supra note 72, at 329.
287 Agency Program Services, supra note 108.
288 Sahr J. Kpundeh, Political Will in Fighting Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY
IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 91, 98 (Sahr J. Kpundeh & Irene Hors eds., 1998),
available at http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/Docs/efa/corruption/Chapter06.pdf.
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mandates for each governmental agency, which would avoid the inevitable
problem of duplication of work, and ease barriers inherent to cross-agency
cooperation.289 An improved information-sharing and communications strategy
may also improve cross-agency cooperation. For instance, computerized casemanagement tracking systems and cross-agency data bases will ensure that
each agency is informed of efforts occurring in other agencies and would also
decrease the possibility of the duplication of work.
By following a stronger preventive approach, the KPK can reduce venality
in the Attorney General’s Office and the National Police Department. As these
agencies learn the importance of reducing public sector corruption, their
attitudes towards cross-agency cooperation may change and, therefore, would
allow an anti-corruption agency to fulfill long-term goals.
C. A Need for Stronger Political Will
Although the KPK has been internationally acclaimed for reducing public
corruption, Indonesia needs a stronger political will—without it, corruption
reform is “mere rhetoric.”290 Strong political will is needed in any level of
corruption reform—including both the multi-agency and centralized agency
strategies.291 Political will is the “demonstrated credible intent of political
actors . . . to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic
level.”292 “Political actors” in this context refers to officials from the legislative
and executive branches.293 At the time of this Comment’s writing, Indonesia
does not have the requisite political will for an effective anti-corruption
strategy; however, this political will may be strengthened by Indonesian
citizens demanding public corruption reform.
1. Evidence of Lack of Political Will in the Indonesian Legislative and
Executive Branches
After the KPK arrested several Indonesian legislators,294 Parliament
“planned to rein in the KPK with a series of changes” to Law Number 30 in
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September 2009.295 These changes were directed to weaken the KPK
considerably, rendering the KPK as virtually powerless.296 Under this
legislation, the KPK would have lost its ability to wiretap phones, thereby
impeding its power to investigate cases regarding corruption.297 Moreover, the
proposed legislation would have mandated that all corruption cases be litigated
using the Indonesian Criminal Code.298 However, this legislation would have
resulted in ambiguity, because the Indonesian Criminal Code requires that the
National Police investigate all criminal matters—therefore, the KPK would
have potentially lost its ability to investigate any allegation of public
corruption.299
The proposed bill also sought to sever the KPK’s powers of prosecution,300
which would have resulted in the Attorney General’s Office being the sole
entity to prosecute corruption cases. However, the Attorney General’s Office is
routinely criticized because of its reputation for allowing the most corrupt
offenders to “evade justice by stopping investigations.”301 Additionally, the
office is known for interfering with prosecutions and is also “lazy in preparing
evidence for trials.”302
The most tremendous impact of the 2009 legislation was the eradication of
the Special Corruption Court. As discussed above, the 2009 legislation allows
judges presiding on a corruption case to be chosen by the corrupt, regular
justice system instead of unbiased professionals from the community.303
Abolishing the Special Corruption Court will have a profound impact on both
the KPK and the Attorney General’s Office—for instance, the corrupt
Indonesian judiciary will ultimately decide the admissibility of any evidence
introduced by prosecutors.304 This law can be seen as Parliament’s attempt to
keep a corrupt judiciary and demonstrates the legislative branch’s lack of
political will.
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It must be noted that the Parliament’s 2009 legislation contained
ambiguous provisions that would have allowed Indonesia to combat public
corruption, despite the changes.305 The Parliament never explained how its
changes to the KPK and Special Corruption Court would satisfy corruption
reform, nor did the Parliament enact supplemental legislation directed at
reducing corruption within the government.306
Additionally, a lack of political will exists in the executive branch.
Although Yudhoyono has made corruption reform the cornerstone of his
campaign, the President still refuses to fire Attorney General Hendarman
Supandji and the head of the National Police, Bambang Hendarso Danuri, even
after their demonstrated participation in a conspiracy to frame the KPK.307
2. Solutions to Indonesia’s Lack of Political Will
Indonesia needs to strengthen its political will so that an anti-corruption
agency can achieve long-term success. A lack of political will may be
overcome by citizens demanding action from public officials, forcing the
officials to effectuate reforms directed at curbing public corruption.308
However, the public must first be informed of the problems of public
corruption before they can demand change.309 Thus, an informed public is
integral to the concept of strengthening political will.310
Political will may be strengthened by giving corruption a “human face.”311
This is achieved by anti-corruption campaigns, such as television and radio
commercials.312 These campaigns personalize corruption by explaining exactly
how individuals are affected by corrupt activity.313 The Indonesian public
becomes empowered if it understands its stake in the abuse of public funds—
abuse that results in higher taxes, lower salaries, and fewer jobs.314 Once the
305
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public feels personally invested in curbing public corruption, they can demand
action from leadership.315 The ICAC’s Community Relations Department, as a
part of its preventive function, has instituted this approach by launching
commercials to enlist the public’s support for fighting corruption.316
There is evidence that political will in Indonesia may improve. During the
New Order, corruption, collusion, and nepotism were an everyday “fact of
life.”317 However, in 2009, the Indonesian public gained increased awareness
of the problems of public corruption and demanded change from political
leaders.318 For instance, when Parliament announced its intention to enact the
legislation in 2009 that would have effectively stripped the KPK of its powers,
the people of Indonesia responded with unprecedented force.319 Crowds of
people gathered in Jakarta declaring their continuous support for the KPK by
shouting, “‘Cinta Indonesia, Cinta KPK,’” which translates as “Love
Indonesia, Love KPK.”320 Members of the public, dressed up as gorillas, tigers,
rabbits, and bears, stormed into the office of Indonesia Corruption Watch
declaring: “‘Even animals want the Corruption Court to remain, and wish for a
stronger KPK.’”321 In the wake of the war of the geckos versus the crocodiles,
nearly one million Facebook users joined a web-group page supporting the
KPK.322
Although the KPK has fostered some public support regarding anticorruption efforts, the KPK needs to apply stronger preventive measures to
ensure the Indonesian public continues to be informed of the dangers of
corruption. By ensuring that the Indonesian public views public corruption
with a “human face,”323 the public may be more likely to build a united front
and demand change from their leaders, which, in turn, would gradually
strengthen Indonesia’s political will.
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319 See Nurfika Osman, Thousands Rally Against Corruption in Jakarta, JAKARTA GLOBE (Nov. 9, 2009),
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AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/09/14/even-animals-want-end-corruption.html.
322 Ulma Haryanto, KPK-Police Battle Spawns Fight Among Indonesia Facebook Users, JAKARTA GLOBE
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IV. REFORMASI WITHIN THE KPK: THE BEST ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY
FRAMEWORK FOR THE KPK
Although Indonesia has insufficient corruption laws, a lack of cross-agency
cooperation, and a lack of political will, Indonesia must still determine its ideal
anti-corruption agency strategy that has the highest possibility of yielding
long-term success. Indonesia is required to have a body that specializes in
combating corruption, as detailed in UNCAC Article 36.324 Additionally, anticorruption agencies often can “empower themselves without having to wait for
statutory revisions of their competences or the adoption of more favourable
legal frameworks to carry out their mandate.”325
The KPK will be unable to achieve any long-term success under its current
organizational framework. This Part argues that the KPK should move away
from the centralized approach and adopt a multi-agency approach with an
emphasis on prevention. First, this Part discusses that the KPK’s current
framework, under the centralized agency approach, is too costly to maintain for
a geographically dispersed, developing country like Indonesia. Second, this
Part argues that the KPK should move away from the centralized approach and
instead adopt a multi-agency approach. Third, this Part argues that the KPK
should adopt a stronger preventive approach to enact true Reformasi
throughout Indonesia and curb public corruption in the long term. Fourth, this
Part argues that the KPK’s prosecutorial and investigative functions should be
eliminated because of the inefficiencies these functions create within
Indonesia’s overall system.
A. Narrowing the Scope of the KPK
The most significant problem with a centralized agency strategy is the
sheer cost of implementation. Generally speaking, the more functions that an
anti-corruption agency seeks to fulfill, the more expensive the agency is to
operate.326 Thus, the multi-agency approach is the cheapest form of an anticorruption agency. For instance, in the United States, the OGE solely focuses
on preventive functions within the executive branch, and employs seventy
people.327 In contrast, a highly centralized approach tends to be the most
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expensive form of an anti-corruption strategy.328 For instance, in Hong Kong,
the ICAC’s focus is on prevention and investigation; it employs 1200 people
and operates in an area with a population of seven million people.329 However,
the KPK is expected to reduce public sector venality by way of prevention,
investigations, and prosecutions—all in an area encompassing 240 million
people and 14,000 islands—with a mere 450 employees.330 At the very least,
the KPK is severely under-funded and, consequently, under-staffed.
An easy solution would be to increase funding. However, in a developing
country like Indonesia, it is safe to assume that financial resources are
extremely scarce. But even if Indonesia’s anti-corruption agency were wellstaffed and well-funded, it would not be able to “reach beyond a relatively few
instances of high profile corruption which are likely centered in the capital.”331
Research indicates that centralized corruption agencies are only effective in
places where there are substantial populations living in a small geographic
area.332 Therefore, a centralized approach may be well-suited for a confined
area like Hong Kong, but in a country as expansive as Indonesia, a centralized
agency would fail to “reach into every province to attack corruption at the
roots.”333
One may argue that the KPK should narrow its focus to Jakarta,
Indonesia’s capital, with a population of over nine million people.334
Unfortunately, this approach would not accomplish the meaningful corruption
reform Indonesia hopes to fulfill. For instance, Transparency International’s335
annual CPI measures a country as a whole—not just one region in a given
country.336 This is significant because foreign investment in a country is
affected by a country’s ranking on this index.337 Additionally, the anti328
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corruption agency would be unable to reach entrenched corruption in various
administrative bureaucracies as well as corruption by local agency and customs
officials.338 Thus, KPK should not confine its scope to only Jakarta.
Instead, the KPK can narrow its scope by eliminating at least one of its key
functions. That way, the agency would be subject to fewer financial constraints
and it could specialize in those functions it decided to retain. For effective
future reform, the KPK should expand its preventive functions and eliminate
its powers of prosecution and investigation.
B. A Stronger Preventive Approach for the KPK
Although the KPK should narrow its scope, its preventive functions are
indispensable and may not be eradicated. Preventive activities include
monitoring of the implementation of anti-corruption policies within individual
agencies and enhancing of civil society participation in the fight against
corruption.339 These preventive activities are the foundation of both the multiagency and centralized approach.340 Additionally, Chapter II of the UNCAC
mandates that each state party “shall” establish a body that prevents corruption
through the tasks of developing, maintaining, revising, and monitoring the
implementation of corruption policies.341 Because Indonesia is required to have
a body specialized in preventing corruption,342 and the KPK’s mandate already
includes these preventive functions, the KPK should continue to include
preventive functions within the scope of its mandate.
Although Indonesia is merely required to have an agency entrusted with
preventive functions, there is an argument that the KPK’s preventive functions
should be strengthened and become its primary focus. At the time of this
Comment’s writing, the “primary thrust of [the KPK’s] activities thus far has
been law enforcement—investigating and prosecuting major corruption
cases.”343 However, an anti-corruption agency’s preventive activities are
integral to effective corruption reform. A strong prevention strategy plays the
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341 UNDP, supra note 339, at 7.
342 Indonesia ratified the UNCAC in 2006. GTZ UNCAC PROJECT, supra note 132, at 1.
343 See Jacobs & Wagner, supra note 72, at 329.
339

MACMILLAN GALLEYSFINAL

626

6/28/2011 10:48 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

“key role for the development of a transparent, accountable and efficient
administrative system,” which leads to improved governance and true
corruption reform.344
To improve its preventive capabilities, the KPK must guide and support
other governmental agencies in implementing anti-corruption policies.345
Guidance and support from an anti-corruption agency have been proven to
improve ethics within other governmental institutions, which lessens public
corruption within these branches of government.346 However, if the KPK were
to offer this guidance by creating individual policy agendas for each institution
within the executive, legislative, and judicial branch, the KPK would require
an inordinate amount of expertise and financial resources. The United States’s
OGE Program Review Division addresses this problem by reviewing and
monitoring an agency’s ethical programs that are already in place, in lieu of
creating an individual policy agenda for that agency.347 If the Program Review
Division identifies a deficiency within a governmental agency, the agency has
sixty days to remedy the problem.348 The KPK should adopt the same
framework as the OGE’s Program Review Division, but in light of the
entrenched corruption in Indonesia, a more aggressive approach might be
needed. For instance, the KPK could work with each agency to set goals for
anti-corruption efforts and review the agency’s progress against set
benchmarks on an ongoing basis.349
Additionally, the KPK should strengthen its preventive activities by
“developing systems and policies that promote transparency and accountability
of the public sector,” for effective public corruption reform.350 Again, the OGE
may provide some guidance. The OGE’s Program Services Division promotes
transparency by managing an annual public financial disclosure reporting
system where senior officials must report information regarding their income
and assets.351 The KPK should adopt this approach, but again, in a more
aggressive capacity. Considering that the production of financial records for
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governmental agencies is not mandatory under Indonesian law,352 the law
governing the KPK should at least have an “illicit enrichment” provision,
which shifts the burden onto public officials to demonstrate that any unusual
wealth they have accrued has a legitimate source.353 This type of provision
would enhance the KPK’s powers to monitor wealth and improve transparency
within the public sector.
Lastly, the KPK should strengthen its preventive functions by promoting
education and awareness of the evils of public corruption, much like Hong
Kong’s ICAC’s Community Relations Department. Increased awareness of the
dangers of corruption enables a public to demand reform and, therefore,
strengthens a country’s political will, as discussed in Part III.
C. The Choice of Adopting a Multi-agency or Centralized Approach:
Eliminating the KPK’s Powers of Investigation and Prosecution
The KPK should eliminate its prosecutorial and investigative functions and
move towards a multi-agency approach for a variety of reasons. First, as Part
III establishes, the KPK’s practice of recruiting the most competent
prosecutors and investigators from the Attorney General’s Office and the
National Police may have the “paradoxical effect” of demoralizing these
institutions, leaving it more corrupt than ever before.354 This practice would be
acceptable if the KPK’s cases demanded investigative and prosecutorial
sophistication. However, the KPK has been accused in the past of “cherrypicking” its cases, or only investigating those cases that are the most likely to
result in criminal convictions and improve the KPK’s performance level.355
Thus, the KPK tends to pick easier cases that do not require the most
competent prosecutors and investigators from Indonesia.
Another issue arises from the fact that the KPK only investigates cases
regarding corruption.356 The problem is that corruption is often an offense
encompassing other non-related crimes.357 As one expert notes:
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While corruption may be the focus of investigatory efforts, it is very
often a symptom or cause of other criminal activity, such as tax
evasion, customs violations, bank fraud, [and] prostitution . . . . Even
if not apparent at the outset of an investigation, these links between
criminal activity often lead investigators in corruption cases to
evidence of other crimes, and vice versa. Leads in corruption
investigations, new witnesses and testimony can arise out of the
investigation of these and other substantive crimes. On a strategic
level, stamping out corruption requires that law enforcement also take
steps to eradicate the criminal activity that spawns corruption.
Tactically, such crimes should be prosecuted together, so that
cases . . . are more effectively prosecuted when criminal charges
relating to the full panoply of conduct can be brought . . . by a single
358
prosecution team.

Therefore, because many cases regarding corruption also deal with other
offenses, prosecutorial and investigative inefficiency occurs when the KPK
and other agencies address a case simultaneously. These inefficiencies
necessarily lead to financial constraints and exemplify why centralized
agencies are so expensive to operate.
Alternatively, other mechanisms can be implemented to ensure that
corruption cases are efficiently investigated and prosecuted. For instance, a law
can be enacted where any corruption investigation the KPK deems as high
priority must proceed to trial, regardless of the Attorney General’s opinion on
the matter. This would remove the traditional prosecutorial discretion that was
widely misused by the Attorney General in previous corruption cases.
Incentives can be offered to investigators, where some sort of monetary award
can be given to those investigators who successfully identify and bring enough
evidence to prosecute a case concerning corruption. Although this system may
be costly, oftentimes corruption within the police force occurs when officers
are underpaid and feel as if they have no resort but to accept bribes in
exchange for the failure to investigate a case. However, the most important
battle is changing these two institutions’ outlooks on corruption. This may be
accomplished by the KPK’s preventive capacities. For instance, the KPK can
provide training for officers, detailing how officers can be ethical while taking
professional pride in what they do. One study found that “officers who took

358

Id.

MACMILLAN GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 10:48 AM

REFORMASI AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION

629

pride in their department were resistant to corruption,” and were more unlikely
to take bribes.359
The KPK needs to change from a centralized strategy to a multi-agency
approach. It is clear that the KPK’s investigative and prosecutorial functions
necessarily lead to inefficiencies within the departments. A better solution is to
improve the ethics of the agencies offering investigative and prosecutorial
service for corruption reform within.
CONCLUSION
Integral to the concept of Reformasi is curbing public corruption. Curbing
public corruption is imperative for overall reform in Indonesia due to the
detrimental effects it has on society. Public corruption taxes the poor and is a
threat to economic and political stability. Furthermore, it reduces the
possibility of foreign investment, which is much needed in developing
countries. The long-term problems with public corruption are exemplified by
Suharto’s participation in the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997, which sparked
widespread riots and the deaths of over 5000 people.360 Although an anticorruption institutional framework was in place at the time of Suharto’s reign,
it failed to work, evidenced by Suharto’s and his inner circle’s acts of blatant
misappropriations of governmental financial resources.361
As Indonesia moved forward in the era of Reformasi, it decided to institute
an anti-corruption agency to promote its efforts in public corruption reform.362
However, anti-corruption agencies are not created equal. Some are based more
on preventive activities, whereas others encompass other areas, such as
prosecutorial and investigational activities.363 Indonesia decided to adopt a
centralized approach and consequently created the KPK.364 Indonesia is
required to have an anti-corruption agency in light of its ratification of the
UNCAC Article 36.365
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http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/indonesia/suharto.html.
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However, there are certain factors that will impede an anti-corruption
agency’s ability to achieve long-term success in a country. These factors
include lack of political will, lack of cross agency cooperation, and inadequate
legal tools. Indonesia has demonstrated problems in each of these areas.366
Indonesia must cure these problems, regardless of what kind of anti-corruption
strategy it decides to adopt. In addition, Indonesia must tailor its anticorruption strategy to fit the needs of the country. Because of Indonesia’s
geography and its financial constraints, the centralized agency approach should
not be used. Instead, the multi-agency approach should be used. This would
enable Indonesia to focus more on prevention and therefore enact true
Reformasi throughout the country.
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